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THE SHAREHOLDER-MANAGED CLOSE
CORPORATION UNDER TBE NEW YORK
BUSINESS CORPORATION LAW
ROBERT A. KESSLER*
I. INTRODUCTION
N O one needs to be reminded of the rapidity with which changes
have taken place in the past few years in every aspect of human
affairs. It is no wonder, then, that the New York Business Corpora-
tion Law's close corporation provisions, hailed on their adoption as
pioneering a new era for the small corporation' have, in the decade
since their effective date, been outstripped in modernity by the enact-
ments of many other states. New York was the first state expressly to
authorize high vote and quorum requirements for director and
shareholder action. This well-known "veto power," so popular in close
corporations, was an innovation which long antedated the Business
Corporation Law, 2 and was subsequently incorporated into it.3 The
Businsess Corporation Law also added such now familiar aids to the
close corporation as mini-boards, 4 multiple office-holdingss and special
dissolution provisions. 6
The most important accommodation to the close corporation's pecu-
liar needs was, however, found in section 620:
(a) An agreement between two or more shareholders, if in writing and signed by the
parties thereto, may provide that in exercising any voting rights, the shares held by
* Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law. Professor Kessler received his B.A
from Yale University, his J.D. from Columbia University and his LL M. from New York
University. He has authored two books and numerous articles on clo.e corporations.
1. See, e.g., 1 F. O'Neal, Close Corporations § 1.14a (1971); Hoffman, New Horizons for the
Close Corporation in New York Under Its New Business Corporation Law, 28 Brooklyn L. Rev
1 (1961) [hereinafter cited as Hoffman].
2. Law of Apr. 6, 1948, ch. 862, § 1, [1948] N.Y. Laws 171st Sess. 1704; Law of Mar 23,
1949, ch. 261, [1949] N.Y. Laws 172d Sess. 839; Law of Apr. 11, 1951, ch. 717, [19511 N.Y_
Laws 174th Sess. 1665 (codified as N.Y. Stock Corp. Law § 9 (McKinney 1951). recodified as
amended, N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law §§ 616, 707-09 (McKinney 1963), as amended, N.Y. Bus. Corp.
Law §§ 616, 709 (McKinney Supp. 1973), as amended, Law of May 23, 1974. ch. 517, 11974]
N.Y. Laws 197th Sess.). This 1948 law was enacted to overcome the judicial invalidation of
non-statutory attempts to obtain such protection for minority shareholders as in Benintendi v.
Kenton Hotel, 294 N.Y. 112, 60 N.E.2d 829 (1945).
3. N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law §§ 616, 709 (McKinney 1963), as amended, N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law
§§ 616, 709 (McKinney Supp. 1973).
4. Id. § 702 (McKinney 1963), as amended, N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 702 (McKinney Supp.
1973).
5. Id. § 715(e) (McKinney 1963), as amended, N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 715(e) €McKinney
Supp. 1973).
6. Id. § 1002 (McKinney 1963).
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them shall be voted as therein provided, or as they may agree, or as determined in
accordance with a procedure agreed upon by them. (b) A provision in the certificate of
incorporation otherwise prohibited by law because it improperly restricts the board in
its management of the business of the corporation, or improperly transfers to one or
more shareholders or to one or more persons or corporations to be selected by him or
them, all or any part of such management otherwise within the authority of the board
under this chapter, shall nevertheless be valid: (1) If all the incorporators or holders of
record of all outstanding shares, whether or not having voting power, have authorized
such provision in the certificate of incorporation or an amendment thereof; and (2) If,
subsequent to the adoption of such provision, shares are transferred or issued only to
persons who had knowledge or notice thereof or consented in writing to such
provision. (c) A provision authorized by paragraph (b) shall be valid only so long as no
shares of the corporation are listed on a national securities exchange or regularly
quoted in an over-the-counter market by one or more members of a national or
affiliated securities association. 7
Subsection (a) merely gave the legislative imprimatur to the almost
universally recognized shareholder pooling agreement. 8 Subsection (b)
was designed to solve the more difficult problem of shareholder
agreements which impinge on the ordinary powers of directors to
manage the corporation. The history of judicial repression of such
agreements prior to the enactment of section 620(b) is well known to
students of the subject. Manson v. Curtis9 invalidated an agreement
which called for a passive board. McQuade v. Stoneham't invalidated
a non-unanimous shareholder agreement to retain an officer at a
specified salary because, at the time, the selection of officers and their
compensation was an exclusively directorial function."I When, how-
ever, the subsequent Clark v. Dodge' 2 decision upheld an agreement
which interfered even more seriously with powers of the board of
directors, but had been approved by the two shareholders who
owned all of the corporation's stock, close corporation lawyers took
7. Id. §§ 620(a), (b), (c), as amended, N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law §§ 620(a), (b), (c) (McKinney
Supp. 1973). The amendments only made slight clarificatory changes in the original version.
Subsections (d) through (g), not quoted in the text, deal with certificate amendments to strike a
§ 620(b) provision, the effect of a § 620(b) provision in imposing managerial responsibility on the
shareholders, and the requirement that the existence of such a provision be noted on the
corporation's share certificates.
8. H. Ballantine, Corporations § 183(3) (rev. ed. 1946); H. Henn, Law of Corporations § 267,
at 527-33 (2d ed. 1970).
9. 223 N.Y. 313, 119 N.E. 559 (1918).
10. 263 N.Y. 323, 189 N.E. 234 (1934).
11. N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 715(b) (McKinney 1963) now allows the certificate of incorpora-
tion to contain a provision for shareholder election of officers, thereby removing (for corporations
which elect to place the required language in the certificate) the objection that such an agreement
interferes with board powers.
12. 269 N.Y. 410, 199 N.E. 641 (1936) (the contract upheld by the court provided that Clark
was to be retained as general manager and was to be paid one quarter of the corporation's net
income; it also provided that the defendant would vote for the plaintiff as a director).
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comfort in the confidence that director-impinging shareholder agree-
ments would be valid as long as they were unanimous.
These hopes were soon dashed by the decision in Long Park, Inc. v.
Trenton-New Brunswick Theatres Co. 13 There, the New York Court
of Appeals distinguished Clark v. Dodge and invalidated a contract,
unanimously approved by the shareholders, which transferred man-
agement for nineteen years to an outside corporation. The interference
-with board management powers in Long Park was found to be more
than the "slight impingement or innocuous variance from the statutory
norm" which was the case in Clark v. Dodge. 14 This was where
matters stood when section 620(b) was enacted.
After some waivering, i s the legislative committee decided that the
purpose of the section was to "expand the ruling in Clark v. Dodge"
and, "to the extent therein provided," to overrule Manson, McQuade
and Long Park. 16 Presumably, the qualification to the overruling refers
merely to the necessity for compliance with the provisions of the
statute in order to obtain its benefits. 17
Unfortunately, despite the length of time which has elapsed since its
enactment, neither the court of appeals nor any other court has given a
definitive exposition of the scope of the section. It is clear from the
language of section 620(b) itself, however, that the required certificate
of incorporation provision can transfer "to one or more shareholders or
to one or more persons or corporations to be selected by him or them,
all or any part of such management otherwise within the authority of
the board . "1... 8 It seems equally clear that such a provision can be
individualized to the extent of naming a particular person or corpora-
tion which is to perform the management function as in Long Park.
13. 297 N.Y. 174, 77 N.E.2d 633 (1948).
14. Id. at 179, 77 N.E.2d at 635; cf. Simonson v. Helburn, 198 Misc. 430, 97 N.Y.S.2d 406
(Sup. Ct. 1950).
15. See N.Y. Joint Legislative Comm. to Study Revision of Corporation Laws--Supplement
to Fourth Interim Report to 1960 Sess. of New York State Legislature, Legislative Doc. (1960)
No. 15 § 6.13, reprinted in [1960] N.Y. Leg. Doc., No. 15 at 36. The original Comment
intimated that even a Clark v. Dodge restriction on the board would have to be inserted in the
certificate, and left some uncertainty as to whether arrangements which completely deprived the
board of power would be valid.
16. N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 620(b), Comment at 418 (McKinney 1963). Other portions of the
final Comment to § 620 read in pertinent part: "The provision authorized by paragraph (b) can be
contained only in the certificate of incorporation. Because of the limitations that it must have
unanimous consent of all shareholders, whether or not entitled to vote, and that the shares of the
corporation must not be publicly listed or quoted either at the time of the agreement or thereafter,
this provision can be practicably used only in close corporations.... Notice of the existence of a
provision authorized by this section must be stated on the certificates for shares." Id.
17. The later amendments to the section would not seem to affect the validity of this
statement of legislative purpose. See note 7 supra.
18. N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 620(b) (McKinney Supp. 1973).
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Most close corporation participants who are dissatisfied with the
ordinary management paradigm, however, probably desire instead to
retain power for themselves as a group and to operate pursuant
to a partnership-type agreement which completely details their
power-financial relationship and the entire mode of operation and
termination of the enterprise. The statutes of a number of states today
expressly empower them to do just that. Thus, what is probably the
best drafted1 9 of the new close corporation statutes, that of Maryland,
expressly authorizes abolition of the board of directors 20 and contains
the following section on stockholders' agreements:
(a) The stockholders of a close corporation may, by an agreement to which all of tile
stockholders of the corporation have actually assented, regulate any aspect of the
affairs of the corporation or the relations of the stockholders, including, but not limited
to:
(1) The management of the business and affairs of the corporation;
(2) Restrictions on the transfer of stock;
(3) The right of one or more stockholders to dissolution of the corporation at will or
upon the occurrence of a specified event or contingency;
(4) The exercise or division of voting power;
(5) The terms and conditions of the employment of any officer or employee
regardless of the length of the period of such employment;
(6) The persons who shall be directors and officers of the corporation; and
(7) The payment of dividends or division of profits.
Such stockholders' agreement shall be embodied in the charter, the bylaws or a written
instrument signed by all of the stockholders of the corporation.
(b) A stockholders' agreement authorized by this section shall not be amended except
by the unanimous written consent of all stockholders then parties to the agreement.
(c) A stockholder who acquires his stock after a stockholders' agreement authorized
by this section has become effective, shall be deemed to have actually assented to, and
shall be a party to, such agreement if at the time of acquiring his stock the stockholder
has actual knowledge of the existence of the agreement; provided, however, that any
stockholder whose stock was acquired by gift or bequest from a person who was a
party to a stockholders' agreement authorized by this section, shall be deemed to have
actually assented to, and shall be a party to, such stockholders' agreement whether or
not he had knowledge of such agreement at the time of acquiring his stock.
(d) A stockholders' agreement authorized by this section may, in the discretion of a
court of equity, be enforced by injunction or by such other relief as the court may
determine to be fair and appropriate in the circumstances. As an alternative to the
granting of an injunction or other equitable relief, the court may, upon the motion of a
party to the proceeding, order dissolution of the corporation under the provisions of
§ 109 (b) and (c) of this article.
(e) Nothing in this section shall otherwise affect otherwise valid agreements among
stockholders of a close or other corporation. (1967, ch. 649, § 14.)21
1 19. See Bradley, A Comparative Evaluation of the Delaware and Maryland Close Corpora-
tions Statutes, 1968 Duke L.J. 525; Dickson, The Florida Close Corporation Act: An Experiment
That Failed, 21 Miami L. Rev. 842 (1967). For a brief description of all the new separate close
corporation statutes, see 1 F. O'Neal, Close Corporations § 1.14b (1971).
20. Md. Ann. Code art. 23 § 105(a)(1) (repl. vol. 1973).
21. Id. § 104. In order to be a"close corporation" entitled to utilize § 104, all that is required
is a statement to that effect in its charter documents. Id. § 100(a).
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Almost identical provisions for omnibus shareholder management
agreements are found in the earlier Florida statute. 22 Manifestly, such
statutes allow close corporations virtually the same flexibility as is
given to a partnership. A number of other recent corporation statutes
also recognize the independent validity of shareholder agreements even
though they deal with the management of the corporation and thereby
impinge on the powers of the directors.
2 3
By contrast, section 620(b) does not validate even a unanimous
director-impinging agreement which goes beyond Clark v. Dodge, but
only a certificate "provision. '24 There is no express authorization in
the New York section for validation of such an agreement through
reference to it in the certificate of incorporation, as may be found, for
example, in the South Carolina statute.2 5 Nor does the New York
statute authorize setting forth the agreement in full in the certificate, as
is allowed by the Florida statute.2 6 Furthermore, the New York
Department of State would undoubtedly reject a certificate which did
the latter; and the former, even if accepted, would probably be
insufficient compliance with the statute to insure judicial enforceabil-
ity.
The problem, then, for New York attorneys whose close corporation
clients want to secure the benefits of operating in partnership style, is
somehow to secure the benefits of the Maryland and Florida statutes,
while complying with the strictures of the less liberal New York
Business Corporation Law.
II. How FAR CAN ONE Go UNDER SECTION 620(b)?
Statutes like that of Maryland allow a very good approximation of
partnership operation for the close corporation2 7 -exactly what most
participants in such corporations want. Professor O'Neal, commenting
on a 1971 New York Court of Appeals decision, 28 has suggested that
For an excellent discussion of the Maryland statute, see Hall, The New Maryland Close
Corporation Law, 27 Md. L. Rev. 341 (1967). See also Md. Ann. Code art. 23, § 100, Comment
(repl. vol. 1973).
22. Fla. StaL Ann. § 608.75(1) (Supp. 1974).
23. See, e.g., Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, §§ 350, 354 (Supp. 1968); N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 55-73
(1965), as amended, N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 55-73 (Supp. 1973); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, § 1385 (1974);
S.C. Code Ann. §§ 12-16.22 (Supp. 1973).
24. N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 620(b) (McKinney 1963), as amended, N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law §
620(b) (McKinney Supp. 1973).
25. S.C. Code Ann. § 12-16.22 (Supp. 1973). See also Md. Ann. Code art. 23, § 104(a) (repl.
vol. 1973).
26. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 608.75(1) (Supp. 1974).
27. Compare the Maryland statute set forth in text accompanying note 21 supra with the
partnership agreement (with optional provisions) in J. Crane & A. Bromberg, Partnership
597-613 (1968).
28. Beresovski v. Warszawski, 28 N.Y.2d 419, 271 N.E.2d 520, 322 N.Y.S.2d 673 (1971).
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the New York legislature should amend the statute to validate
shareholder agreements and by-law provisions for high vote re-
quirements. 29 It would be better still if the legislature adopted a
provision like that in the Maryland statute which goes much further by
validating any unanimous shareholder agreement even though it effec-
tively makes the corporation a partnership, while retaining the added
corporate advantage of limited liability. Until the legislature does so, it
is advisable for New York close corporations to attempt to get as many
of the advantages of the Maryland statute as they can under the
present law. The simplest way of doing this is to consider the various
sections of the Maryland statute and explore their potential availability
through manipulation of section 620(b), and other related sections of
the New York statute.
A. Management
The Maryland statute allows a shareholder agreement to regulate
"[t]he management of the business and affairs of the corporation. ' 30 As
The "Beresovski" clause was part of a shareholder agreement. It provided: " '[Ihf any illegal
provision [of the shareholder agreement] can be cured by amending the certificate of incorpora-
tion, the parties agree to take such action immediately.' " Id. at 423, 271 N.E.2d at 522, 322
N.Y.S.2d at 675.
29. With his customary accuracy and perception Professor O'Neal discusses the case as
follows: "The apparent willingness of the Court of Appeals in the Beresovski case to specifically
enforce an express undertaking in a shareholders' agreement to amend a corporation's charter to
insert high vote requirements for shareholder and director action opens up the possibility that by
a two-step process a shareholder can enforce in New York a shareholders' agreement or a bylaw
fixing high vote requirements but making no express mention of amendment of the charter. If
shareholders enter into an agreement fixing high vote requirements do they not impliedly
undertake to do what should be done to make their agreement effective or at least to take
reasonable action to implement it? And in this setting should not bylaws be treated as a contract
among those shareholders who approve the bylaws? If the answers to these questions are in the
affirmative, a shareholder could bring an action first to enforce specifically the implied contrac-
tual undertaking to amend the charter to insert high vote requirements and then to enforce the
high vote requirements after they had been inserted in the charter.
"If the courts would recognize in shareholders' agreements and bylaws fixing high vote
requirements an implied undertaking by parties to an agreement and shareholders who have
approved bylaws to take the kind of action that was expressly promised by the parties to the
agreement in the Beresovski case, namely, to amend the charter to implement the agreement,
they could reach a just and wise result in that they would gratify the reasonable expectations of
businessmen, often unsophisticated in legal matters, and protect them against the mistakes of
careless, inept, or uninformed lawyers and perhaps on occasion even the misconduct of an
unethical lawyer who (purporting to represent all the shareholders in a corporation) might let
some of them rely on a shareholders' agreement or a bylaw he knows is unenforceable unless
implemented by appropriate charter provisions.
"An even better solution of course would be for the New York legislature to amend the statute
to make shareholders' agreements and bylaws fixing high vote requirements valid and enforce-
able." 1 F. O'Neal, Close Corporations § 4.14 n.7 (Cum. Supp. 1974).
30. See note 21 supra and accompanying text.
CLOSE CORPORATIONS
indicated above, there is no controlling New York case law. However,
one of the principal draftsmen of the New York statute, Samuel
Hoffman, has written the following about section 620(b):
The clear import of paragraph (b) of section 620 is to authorize the owners of the
close corporate enterprise to manage its affairs directly, as in the case of the
partnership, without the impedimenta inherent in formal board operation. It is
abundantly clear that Clark v. Dodge has been codified and extended, and that Long
Park, Inc. v. Trenton-New Brunswick Theatres Co. has been legislatively overruled.
It is clear, likewise, that there are no limitations, if section 620 is satisfied, on the
extent to which the authority of the board can be invaded. Presumably, the board can
be deposed of authority and entirely "put to bed." 3'
The New York Department of State has indicated its agreement
with this interpretation and permits the filing of a certificate of
-incorporation that contains a provision transferring corporate man-
agement from the directors to the shareholders. 32 It would seem,
therefore, reasonably safe to rely on the validity of such a delegation.
In the absence of certificate delegation of managment to the sharehol-
ders, the extent of shareholder intrusion on management by virtue of
even unanimous agreement is uncertain, 33 and complete delegation of
director power seems clearly proscribed.3 4
Accordingly, a section 620(b) certificate provision delegating all
power to the shareholders may be the only way of securing the
complete benefits of the Maryland statutory provision, since such a
delegation would then validate a shareholder management agreement
under section 620(a).
31. Hoffman 9-10 (footnotes omitted). See also 3 F. White, New York Corporations
620.03[3] (13th ed. J. O'Brien, G. Aldi, & P. Van Leuvian 1973) [hereinafter cited as White).
32. Professor Fogelman, accordingly, suggests the following provision: "All managerial acts
in the conduct of the corporate affairs shall be authorized or consented to by the shareholders and
the board shall have no discretion or power in connection therewith." McKinney's Forms, Bus.
Corp. Law § 7:20 (1965).
Another leading text, 3 White Form No. 620:1, proposes the following language: "All of the
powers of the Board of Directors in the conduct and management of corporate affairs are
assumed by the shareholders." See also id. Form No. 620.3 which commences: "The business of
the corporation and the conduct of its affairs shall be managed by its common shareholders ... "
33. The leading case upholding such agreements is Clark v. Dodge, 269 N.Y. 410, 199 N.E.
641 (1936). See also Cohen v. Wacht, 124 N.Y.S.2d 207 (Sup. CL), aff'd mem., 282 App. Div.
1054, 126 N.Y.S.2d 910 (2d Dep't 1953) and cases cited therein. The leading cases to the contrary
are Long Park, Inc. v. Trenton-New Brunswick Theatres Co., 297 N.Y. 174, 77 N.E.2d 633
(1948); Benintendi v. Kenton Hotel, Inc., 294 N.Y. 112, 60 N.E.2d 829 (1945). See generally 18
C.J.S. Corporations § 497 (1939).
34. Long Park, Inc. v. Trenton-New Brunswick Theatres Co., 297 N.Y. 174, 77 N.E.2d 633
(1948). A less than unanimous agreement providing for delegation of director powers is void.
Mlanson v. Curtis, 223 N.Y. 313, 119 N.E. 559 (1918). Even what might be regarded as slight
intrusions on board powers are equally interdicted. In re Estate of Hirshon, 13 N.Y.2d 787, 192
N.E.2d 174, 242 N.Y.S.2d 218 (1963), modifiying 17 App. Div. 2d 962, 233 N.Y.S.2d 1018 (2d
Dep't 1962) (will provisions); McQuade v. Stoneham, 263 N.Y. 323, 189 N.E. 234 (1934).
1974]
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B. Transfer of Stock
The Maryland statute allows a shareholder agreement to impose
restrictions on the transfer of stock. 3" The only general statutory
provision on the subject in New York, except for Article 8 of the
Uniform Commercial Code with its implied recognition of such
restrictions, 36 is section 508(d) of the Business Corporation Law which
merely provides that "[s]hares shall be transferable in the manner
provided by law and in the by-laws."'37 However, "reasonable" share
transfer restrictions imposed by shareholder agreement were recog-
nized as valid even before enactment of the Business Corporation
Law,38 and, undoubtedly, continue to be permissible. Furthermore,
the Business Corporation Law expressly recognizes the validity of one
form of such "restriction"-a corporate contract to repurchase a
holder's shares. 39
Thus, while the full range of share transfer restrictions possible
under more modern statutes40 may not be available to New York close
corporations, the common first option and repurchase-on-death plans
can be incorporated into shareholder agreements even without reliance
on the close corporation provision of the statute.
C. Dissolution
The Maryland statute allows a shareholder agreement to set forth
"[t]he right of one or more stockholders to dissolution of the corpora-
tion at will or upon the occurrence of a specified event or
contingency. '41 Section 1002 of the New York Business Corporation
Law is practically identical in language, except that, like section
620(b), it requires a certificate of incorporation provision. 42 There is,
therefore, a question as to whether a mere agreement providing for
dissolution under specified circumstances will be valid unless accom-
panied by a sufficient certificate provision. Unfortunately, no re-
35. Md. Ann. Code art. 23, § 104(a)(2) (rep]. vol. 1973).
36. N.Y. U.C.C. § 8-204 (McKinney 1964).
37. N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 508(d) (McKinney Supp. 1973).
38. See Tomoser v. Kamphausen, 307 N.Y. 797, 121 N.E.2d 622 (1954).
39. N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 514 (McKinney 1963).
40. See Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, §§ 202, 343(a) (Supp. 1968); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 14A:7-12
(1969). New York recognizes the common first option and repurchase contracts. See R. Kessler,
New York Close Corporations § 9.04 (1968).
41. Md. Ann. Code art. 23, § 104(a)(3) (repl. vol. 1973). For possible events which might be
set forth to trigger dissolution, see 2 F. O'Neal, Close Corporations § 9.06 (1971).
42. N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 1002(a) (McKinney 1963) provides: "The certificate of incorpora-
tion may contain a provision that any shareholder, or the holders of any specified number or
proportion of shares . . . of any class or series thereof, may require the dissolution of the
corporation at will or upon the occurrence of a specified event."
[Vol. 43
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ported case under the Business Corporation Law appears definitively
to have passed on the issue.
4 3
Section 1001 allows the holders of two-thirds of the outstanding
shares to dissolve the corporation. No director action is required.
4 4
Accordingly, a dissolution agreement does not constitute an intrusion
on board powers, and section 620(b) is not brought into play. Since the
matter is on the shareholder level, an agreement which provides that
the shareholders will vote for dissolution under conditions set forth in
their agreement should be as valid as any other agreement as to how
they will vote their shares as shareholders.
45
The late Carlos Israels, an acknowledged expert on corporate law,
believed that such an agreement would have been upheld under the
old law, and he saw no reason to change that opinion, despite the
enactment of section 1002. In his last book, discussing the problem of
deadlock, he stated:
Absent a provision of the certificate of incorporation permitting dissolution at the
instance of a minority. .. , dissolution can be brought about only by the vote of the
statutory two-thirds majority .... However, such a vote may be obtainable by means
of a provision of a shareholders' agreement, valid under N.Y. BCL § 620(a) and Del.
GCL § 218(c) as an agreement to vote shares as therein provided, which in the event of
one or more specified events or contingencies would require that the shareholders cast
their votes for dissolution.4 6
Unfortunately, however, Professor Israels' interpretation is not shared
by Professor Hoffman. Referring to the Business Corporation Law
section which became the present certificate-dissolution provision (sec-
tion 1002), 4 7 he has stated:
43. MIaf.nis v. Miller, 24 App. Div. 2d 741, 260 N.Y.S.2d 503 (1st Dep't 1965) (mem.), affd
mem., 19 N.Y.2d 875, 227 N.E.2d 596, 280 N.Y.S.2d 675 (1967), dealt with an agreement
allowing a shareholder to dissolve a corporation if his shares were not repurchased. Although the
court referred to a "de facto dissolution" resulting from the failure of the other shareholders to
carry out the agreement, it held that, in the absence of a legal dissolution, the defendant
shareholder whose shares were not repurchased was not freed from his fiduciary obligation not to
take over the corporate business for himself. The case is, therefore, hardly authority one way or
the other as to the validity of a dissolution agreement.
44. N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 1001 (McKinney 1963) provides: "A corporation may be
dissolved under this article. Such dissolution shall be authorized at a meeting of shareholders by
the vote of the holders of two-thirds of all outstanding shares entitled to vote thereon, except as
otherwise provided under section 1002 .... "
45. See id. § 620(a), as amended, N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 620(a) (McKinney Supp. 1973), set
out at text accompanying note 7 supra.
46. C. Israels, Corporate Practice § 4.30 (2d ed. 1969); see In re Hega Knitting Mills, Inc.,
124 N.Y.S.2d 115 (Sup. CL 1953) (upholding, under the old law, a unanimous agreement to vote
to dissolve the corporation upon the happening of a stated contingency).
47. The special dissolution provision, formerly § 1105, became § 1002 by Law of Apr. 24,
1962, ch. 834, § 71, [1962] N.Y. Laws 185th Sess. 3596 and was revised by Law of Apr. 23,
1963, ch. 748, § 15, [1963) N.Y. Laws 186th Sess. 2537 and codified in N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law
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Close corporation practitioners have for some time resorted to the technique of
incorporating in shareholders' agreements a provision that in the event of deadlock or
other stated contingency all of the shareholders shall be obliged to vote their shares to
effect a dissolution. The validity of such attempt to evade the deadlock statute or to
provide for dissolution in terms that vary from existing statutory authorization is at
least contentious under existing case law. Section 1105 resolves this controversy by
authorizing such a dissolution expedient but only if the provision therefor is incorpo-
rated in the certificate of incorporation. The adoption of the statutory formula in
section 1105 would seem preemptive and it is to be assumed that, after the effective
date of the new business corporation law, the courts will not enforce the typical clause
in a shareholders' agreement, unincorporated in the certificate of incorporation, which
seeks to authorize corporate dissolution at will or upon a stated contingency. 48
One authority has intimated that even a high vote requirement for
dissolution must comply with section 1002. 49 Such an interpretation
may well be correct, since section 1001, the ordinary voluntary dissolu-
tion provision, expressly allows deviations from its terms only by a
provision under the former section.50 This would mean that the special
requirements of section 1002 must be complied with."' If so, this
would indicate an even greater preemption of the field by section 1002.
Although not completely without ambiguity, the Reviser's
Comment5 2 tends to support Israels' position. Hopefully, it will be the
one to prevail, at least where the shareholder agreement is unanimous.
Undoubtedly, a "Beresovski clause"53 would not hurt.
However, the Department of State has indicated that it will accept a
certificate of incorporation which provides that the specified event
provoking dissolution under section 1002 will be an arbitrator's deci-
sion, or a judicial determination of breach of a shareholders'
agreement.5 4 Since either of these events should prove sufficient for
§ 1002 (McKinney 1963). The change in language, which occurred after Professor Hoffman's
article, would not seem to affect his comments.
48. Hoffman 20-21 (footnotes omitted).
49. O'Connell, Dissolution as a Remedy for Dissension and Deadlock in the New York
Closely-Held Corporation, 19 Buffalo L. Rev. 585, 596 (1970).
50. N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 1001 (McKinney 1963). For text of § 1001 see note 44 supra.
51. N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 1002(b) (McKinney 1963) requires unanimous shareholder (voting
and non-voting) approval for addition of the provision by certificate amendment, as well as for
any change or deletion, unless a different proportion is specifically provided for in the certificate.
Id. § 1002(c) requires conspicuous notice of the existence of the provision on each share
certificate. This might (but hopefully will not be so interpreted) render a mere general reference to
a high vote requirement (under § 616) for shareholder action insufficient notice.
52. "A shareholders' agreement for dissolution would probably be held valid in the absence of
statutory recognition of its validity. Since such a provision must be in the certificate of
incorporation by unanimous shareholder consent, its use would be feasible only in close
corporations and the anticipated condition would normally be a state of deadlock or dissension.
Thus the section supplies a useful supplement to § 1104." N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 1002,
Comment (McKinney 1963).
53. See note 28 supra.
54. Letter of Glenn C. Relyea, Esq., Associate Attorney, Bureau of Corporations, State of
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most close corporations, prudence dictates that one or the other of
these provisions be added to the certificate to assure implementation of
the shareholder agreement's dissolution arrangement, even though the
agreement may be independently enforceable.
D. Voting Requirements
The Maryland statute allows a shareholder agreement to govern
"[the exercise or division of voting power.""5s This would seem to
authorize not only "pooling agreements" (agreements as to how the
shareholders will vote their shares), but also arrangements fixing
quorum and voting requirements higher or lower than the normal
statutory ones (for example, that certain actions must be approved by
all the shareholders). It might even go further, and permit alteration
of the normal voting power of shares (for example, giving a 25 percent
shareholder a 50 percent vote).5 6 Pooling agreements are, of course,
valid in New York under section 620(a). s 7 It would seem equally clear
that alterations in normal per share voting powers will be invalid
without an explicit certificate of incorporation provision on the sub-
ject, despite the existence of a section 620(b) provision.5 8
The Business Corporation Law does not authorize a lower vote than
that of a majority (or plurality in the case of election of directors)., 9 It
does, however, allow the by-laws to fix a quorum of as few as
one-third of the shares. 60 It is not certain that a mere agreement will
suffice where the statute requires a by-law provision, since the court of
appeals has taken a strict view of what is required to constitute a
by-law provision. 61 However, low-vote provisions are ordinarily not
wanted by close corporations. If any change in the statutory majority
New York, Department of State, Division of Corporations and State Records, to the author,
dated Oct. 9, 1974.
For other certificate dissolution provisions, see 4 White, Forms Nos. 1002:1 through 1002:6.
55. Md. Ann. Code art. 23, § 104(a)(4) (repl. vol. 1973).
56. Such an agreement was held invalid in Nickolopoulos v. Sarantis, 102 N.J. Eq. 585, 141
A. 792 (CL Err. & App. 1928).
57. N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 620(a) (McKinney 1963) is set forth at text accompanying note 7
supra.
58. N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 612(a) (McKinney 1963) provides: "Every shareholder of record
shall be entitled at every meeting of shareholders to one vote for every share standing in his name
on the record of shareholders, unless otherwise provided in the certificate of incorporation." See
also N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 613 (McKinney 1963). An alteration in the voting power of shares is
obviously not an interference with board power, but rather with shareholder power, and
accordingly, not within the compass of § 620(b).
59. N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 614 (McKinney 1963).
60. Id. § 608(b).
61. See Model, Roland & Co. v. Industrial Acoustics Co., 16 N.Y.2d 703, 209 N.E.2d 553,
261 N.Y.S.2d 896 (1965) (mem.) (holding that a mere resolution increasing the number of
directors did not constitute an "amendment" of the by-laws).
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rule norm is chosen, it is usually of the high-quorum, high-vote
variety.
Before the enactment of statutory authorization for such super-
majority provisions, it was expressly held that an agreement imposing
such a requirement was unenforceable. 62 Under section 616 and its
predecessor, 63 both of which expressly allow high vote and quorum
requirements to be imposed by the certificate of incorporation, mere
by-law provisions were held insufficient by the court of appeals. 64 An
appellate division decision under the predecessor statute also expressly
held that an agreement would not suffice. 6 5 Although a more recent
appellate division decision, 66 and the court of appeals in the Be-
resovski case, 67 give indications of a change in attitude toward the
validity of such agreements, it would seem wise to comply with the
statutory requirements in this regard, since it can be done without
great difficulty.
Thus, a shareholder agreement requiring the consent of all (or some
other proportion greater than a majority) of the parties for all, or at
least significant, management decisions (as well as fundamental or-
ganic changes) can be validated, once power has been transferred to
the shareholders under section 620(b), by the addition of relatively easy
to draft high vote and quorum provisions.
E. Employment
The Maryland statute also authorizes a shareholder agreement re-
garding "[t]he terms and conditions of the employment of any officer or
employee regardless of the length of the period of such employment. '68
62. Benintendi v. Kenton Hotel, Inc., 294 N.Y. 112, 60 N.E.2d 829 (1945).
63. Law of Apr. 6, 1948, ch. 862, § 1, [1948] N.Y. Laws 17 1st Sess. 1704; Law of Mar. 23,
1949, ch. 261, [1949] N.Y. Laws 172d Sess. 839; Law of Apr. 11, 1951, ch. 717, [1951] N.Y.
Laws 174th Sess. 1665 (codified at N.Y. Stock Corp. Law § 9 (McKinney 1951)), recodified as
amended, N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law §§ 616, 707-09 (McKinney 1963), as amended, N.Y. Bus. Corp.
Law §§ 616, 709 (McKinney Supp. 1973), as amended, Law of May 23, 1974, ch. 517, [19741
N.Y. Laws 197th Sess.).
64. Model, Roland & Co. v. Industrial Acoustics Co., 16 N.Y.2d 703, 209 N.E.2d 553, 261
N.Y.S.2d 896 (1965) (mem.); In re Faehndrich, Inc., 2 N.Y.2d 468, 141 N.E.2d 597, 161
N.Y.S.2d 99 (1957).
65. Fromkin v. Merrall Realty Inc., 15 App. Div. 2d 919, 225 N.Y.S.2d 632 (2d Dep't)
(mem.), appeal denied, 11 N.Y.2d 647 (1962). See also DeVecchi v. DeVecchi, 34 App. Div. 2d
790, 311 N.Y.S.2d 530 (2d Dep't 1970) (mem.), discussed at note 78 infra.
66. Shubin v. Surchin, 27 App. Div. 2d 452, 280 N.Y.S.2d 55 (1st Dep't 1967). See also
Christal v. Petry, 275 App. Div. 550, 560, 90 N.Y.S.2d 620, 629 (1st Dep't 1949), aff'd mem.,
301 N.Y. 562, 93 N.E.2d 450 (1950) (intimating that a unanimous shareholder agreement-the
agreement in this case was not unanimous-could impose a high vote requirement).
67. Beresovski v. Warszawski, 28 N.Y.2d 419, 271 N.E.2d 520, 322 N.Y.S.2d 673 (1971).
68. Md. Ann. Code art. 23, § 104(a)(5) (repl. vol. 1973).
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A corporation, of course, has the power to hire employees and appoint
officers. 69 Although certain earlier cases were to the contrary,7 0 it
appears that even a long term employment contract is valid if ap-
proved by the board of directors.7 1 Furthermore, the Business Corpo-
ration Law expressly recognizes even contracts to employ persons as
officers. 7 2 Corporate contracts of the type authorized by the Maryland
statute should, therefore, be valid. 73
1 The question remains, however, whether a shareholder agreement
can accomplish this. Such agreements are common in New York, at
least as to officer status. 74 Shareholder agreements for election of
officers and the fixing of their compensation are, however,
director-intrusive,75 although probably valid if unanimous. 76 How-
ever, section 715(b) provides:
The certificate of incorporation may provide that all officers or that specified officers
shall be elected by the shareholders instead of by the board."'
Thus by the simple expedient of inserting such a provision in the
certificate of incorporation, agreements to vote to elect officers become,
like the election of directors, no longer director-impinging, and the
proper subject of a pooling agreement under section 620(a).
As to employment of non-officer personnel, there are at least two
69. N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 202(a)(10) (McKinney 1963).
70. See 1 F. O'Neal, Close Corporations § 6.06 (1971) and cases cited therein.
71. See Staklinski v. Pyramid Elec. Co., 6 N.Y.2d 159, 160 N.E.2d 78, 188 N.Y.S.2d 541
(1959) (11 years); Heaman v. E.N. Rowell Co., 261 N.Y. 229, 185 N.E. 83 (1933) (lifetime)
(dictum).
72. N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 716(b) (McKinney 1963).
73. See generally 1 F. O'Neal, Close Corporations §§ 5.18, 6.06 (1971).
74. See C. Israels, Corporate Practice 97, 483-84 (2d ed. 1969).
75. McQuade v. Stoneham, 263 N.Y. 323, 189 N.E. 234 (1934).
76. See Clark v. Dodge, 269 N.Y. 410, 199 N.E. 641 (1936). See also 3 White S 620.03[21,
citing numerous lower court decisions predating enactment of the Business Corporation Law.
"The majority of these cases have upheld shareholders' agreements entered into for the following
purposes, at least in those instances in which all shareholders were parties to the agreement: (1) to
elect or designate certain persons as officers (Agreements of this nature have uniformly been
construed to imply that the designated persons are removable for cause.); (2) to fix salaries or
compensation of officers; (3) to set tenure of officers. On the other hand, agreements for the
following purposes have been held invalid: (1) to vest management of corporate affairs in
shareholders; (2) to establish policy for distribution of dividends or assets. As indicated above, the
courts have displayed a more liberal attitude towards the validity of shareholders' agreements
since the Clark v. Dodge decision in 1936, but they have not consistently upheld restrictive
agreements since that time." Id. § 620.03 at 461-62 (footnotes & emphasis omitted); Lubliner v.
Sylu Knitting Mills, Inc., 213 N.Y.S.2d 726 (Sup. CL 1961) (holding that a unanimous
shareholder agreement designating officers is valid, but will be construed to provide for
continuation in office only so long as the officers remain faithful and efficient).
77. N.Y. Bus. Cdrp. Law § 715(b) (McKinney 1963). For a form of certificate of incorpora-
tion provision providing for election of officers by the shareholders, see 3 White Form No. 7 15:1.
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long-standing decisions which indicate the validity of agreements to
cause the hiring of such personnel even though the corporation is not a
party, despite the intrusion on the board's management powers which
such agreements represent. 78 Therefore, it should follow a fortiori,
78. Miller v. Vanderlip, 285 N.Y. 116, 33 N.E.2d 51 (1941) involved an agreement between
plaintiff and six other persons who, at the request of the majority (but not sole) shareholders,
were to rehabilitate a floundering corporation. The court stated that even if it were assumed that
defendants were shareholders (which the complaint did not allege) it would not be illegal for them
to agree to advocate a plan which, inter alia, called for the hiring of plaintiff as president and
general manager for a three year period at a stated salary and, accordingly, a cause of action for
damages was stated against them for failure to do so. The court added: "The fact that plaintiff
might not be eligible to be both president [since not a director, as then required] and general
manager is no excuse for the failure of the defendants to urge the selection of plaintiff for tile
position of general manager, albeit in that event the remuneration of plaintiff probably would not
have been the same as if he had occupied both positions." Id. at 124, 33 N.E.2d at 55.
In Cuppy v. Ward, 187 App. Div. 625, 176 N.Y.S. 233 (1st Dep't), aff'd mem., 227 N.Y. 603,
125 N.E. 915 (1919), plaintiff Cuppy and defendant Ward were the sole shareholders of the
defendant Pennsylvania corporation, which was not expressly a party to the agreement between
them. Although the court in a 3 to 2 decision (the "swing-man" concurring on the ground that a
New York court should not interfere in the internal affairs of a foreign corporation), held that the
complaint would not support the grant of a mandatory injunction restoring plaintiff to his
position as a manager of the corporation. The court clearly recognized the plaintiff's right to
damages for breach of the defendant's promise that plaintiff would be continued in the
corporation's employ at a specified salary with certain powers, although the corporation was not a
party, and, more importantly, indicated that it would go along with the dissent in approving
equitable relief if the contract had been entered into as a part of the agreement to form the
corporation. The court stated: "If he held a contract binding on the corporation to employ him for
a definite time at a fixed compensation, and he was wrongfully discharged, he has a full and
adequate remedy at law for damages. If his contract was not binding on the corporation, but
Ward personally was obligated to him [in] so far as he was able to keep him in that position for a
definite time at a fixed compensation, and Ward caused his discharge by making or instigating
others to make false and untrue charges which caused him to lose his position, he also has a full
and adequate remedy at law against Ward for damages." Id. at 628-29, 176 N.Y.S. at 236.
For a more recent case upholding a shareholder employment contract, see Samuelson v. Starr,
28 Misc. 2d 479, 481, 213 N.Y.S.2d 889, 891-92 (Sup. Ct. 1961) ("Such agreement by all of the
stockholders of a corporation to vote for certain persons as directors and to continue a director as
manager is not unlawful on its face and may be specifically enforced if there is no interference
with the rights of creditors or minority stockholders.").
On the other hand, a recent second department decision refused to enforce such an employment
agreement. In DeVecchi v. DeVecchi, 34 App. Div. 2d 790, 311 N.Y.S.2d 530 (2d Dep't 1970)
(mem.), an apparently unanimous shareholder agreement provided that the parties' salaries as
officers, directors or employees would be "fixed by the mutual consent of all the parties hereto." It
was further agreed that any increases would require the unanimous consent of the shareholders.
After being fixed at $125 per week, pursuant to the agreement, one party's salary was reduced,
over his objection, to $50 a week. Although it could merely have held the agreement inapplicable,
since a reduction rather than an increase in salary had taken place, the court chose to hold the
agreement invalid, stating, "[iln our opinion, those provisions of the stockholders' agreement
requiring mutual and unanimous consent of all parties on fixation of salaries were mere
agreements to agree in the future, unenforceable and not binding on appellants (Benintendl v.
Kenton Hotel, 294 N.Y. 112, 120; St. Regis Paper Co. v. Hubbs & Hastings Paper Co., 235
N.Y. 30, 36)." Id., 311 N.Y.S.2d at 531.
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that where a section 620(b) provision transfers board power to the
shareholders there should be no doubt as to the validity of a contract
hiring employees, if approved by the shareholders. 79
While there is authority that otherwise valid shareholder agreements
will be binding on the corporation without formal approval by it,
validity should be absolutely assured as to both officers and employees
by the corporation's formal assent to the contract, and, accordingly, the
shareholder agreement should add that they agree to cause the corpo-
ration to become a party to any agreement on the subject.8 0 In this
way, by utilizing the two certificate of incorporation provisions, there
should be no doubt as to the availability of the benefit afforded by the
Maryland statute to New York corporations.
F. Directors and Officers
The Maryland statute expressly adds authorization for a shareholder
agreement to determine who will be the directors and officers of the
corporation.81 This is the least radical of its provisions. Agreements for
the election of named directors have long been valid in New York,8 2
as well as other states,8 3 even without statutory authorization. They
The St. Regis Paper case did hold a price term in a contract for the sale of paper to be
unenforceable, as an agreement to agree, where the price was to be fixed by mutual consent, and,
accordingly, could have been the sole authority for the decision. The additional citation of
Benintendi adds a further disturbing element, since that case held by-law provisions requiring
unanimity for shareholder and director action invalid as in conflict with the statutory norm, and
also refused to enforce the underlying shareholder agreement which similarly required consent of
both (the only) shareholders to such action. The citation of both cases, therefore, indicates the
erection of two hurdles which must be overcome before the validity of the arrangement can be
achieved, at least in the second department. Fixing a definite dollar salary in the agreement, and
requiring mutual consent to change it (the latter provision bulwarked by high vote requirements
in the certificate of incorporation) would appear to be sufficient to get around this case.
That the corporation may be bound by a shareholder agreement even though not expressly a
party, see Kolmer-Marcus, Inc. v. Winer, 32 App. Div. 2d 763, 300 N.Y.S.2d 952 (1st Dep't
1969) (mem.), affd mem., 26 N.Y.2d 795, 257 N.E.2d 664, 309 N.Y.S.2d 220 (1970) (share
transfer agreement); Weber v. Sidney, 19 App. Div. 2d 494, 244 N.Y.S.2d 228 (1st Dep't 1963),
afi'd mem., 14 N.Y.2d 929, 200 N.E.2d 867, 252 N.Y.S.2d 327 (1964) (agreement for division of
profits); Siegel v. Ribak, 43 Misc. 2d 7, 249 N.Y.S.2d 903 (Sup. CL 1964) (arbitration
agreement). See also In re Estate of Klaum, 58 Misc. 2d 262, 294 N.Y.S.2d 877 (Sur. Ct. 1968)
(share transfer agreement; relying, however, on the fact that although the corporate officers did
not sign the agreement it did bear the corporate seal).
79. See C. Israels, Corporate Practice app. B (2d ed. 1969) for a form of employment contract
providing for, in each instance, shareholder approval as an alternative to board action in
determination of duties, increases of compensation, dismissal, etc.
80. See, e.g., Beresovski v. Warszawski, 28 N.Y.2d 419, 271 N.E.2d 520, 322 N.Y.S.2d 673
(1971); 1 F. O'Neal, Close Corporations § 4.14 (Supp. 1974).
81. Md. Ann. Code art. 23, § 104(a)(6) (repl. vol. 1973).
82. Clark v. Dodge, 269 N.Y. 410, 199 N.E. 641 (1936); McQuade v. Stoneham, 263 N.Y.
323, 189 N.E. 234 (1934); Manson v. Curtis, 223 N.Y. 313, 119 N.E. 559 (1918).
83. See 19 Am. Jur. 2d Corporations § 683 (1965); Annot., 45 A.L.R.2d 799, 804 (1956).
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have now been expressly recognized by the Business Corporation
Law.84
The board is, however, not only superfluous to the average close
corporation, but, because of the requirement of per capita voting, a
definite impediment to its flexible functioning. Accordingly, it has been
assumed throughout this Article that the board has been "sterilized" of
power. As a result, the power to designate who will constitute the
board is of little concern, although the shareholder agreement will
normally provide for its membership.
As pointed out above, 8 5 unanimous shareholder agreements desig-
nating officers were upheld in New York even under its old statute,
although the selection of officers is normally a directorial rather than
shareholder function. With a certificate of incorporation provision
allowing the shareholders to vote for officers, as authorized under
section 715, there should be no doubt as to the validity of shareholder
agreements designating officers, even without a section 620(b) provi-
sion.
G. Dividends
The Maryland statute allows a shareholder agreement to regulate
"[t]he payment of dividends or division of profits. ' '86 It is hornbook
law that the declaration of dividends is a matter ordinarily within the
discretion of the board of directors. 87 This rule applies, of course, even
to close corporations.
88
Accordingly, White points out that agreements to establish policy for
distribution of dividends or assets were held invalid under the case law
preceding the enactment of the Business Corporation Law, citing two
early cases. 89 While the first case cited 90 is perhaps distinguishable on
the ground that the agreement represented an attempt to treat the
corporation as a joint venture, the second is clear in its statement of
directorial power: "The directors are the only persons who can appro-
84. N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 620(a) (McKinney 1963).
85. See Part II(E) supra.
86. Md. Ann. Code art. 23, § 104(a)(7) (repl. vol. 1973).
87. H. Henn, Corporations 665 (2d ed. 1970); see In re Estate of Carlisle, 53 Misc. 2d 546,
278 N.Y.S.2d 1011 (Sur. Ct. 1967); Lippman v. New York Water Serv. Corp., 25 Misc. 2d 267,
205 N.Y.S.2d 541 (Sup. Ct.), appeal dismissed, 12 App. Div. 2d 611, 214 N.Y.S.2d 715 (1st
Dep't 1960).
88. See Gottfried v. Gottfried, 73 N.Y.S.2d 692 (Sup. Ct. 1947).
89. 3 White 620.03[2] n.83, citing Flanagan v. Flanagan, 273 App. Div. 918, 77 N.Y.S.2d
682 (2d Dep't) (mem.), affd mem., 298 N.Y. 787, 83 N.E.2d 473 (1948), and Cuppy v. Ward,
187 App. Div. 625, 176 N.Y.S. 233 (1st Dep't), affd mer., 227 N.Y. 603, 125 N.E. 915 (1919).
90. Flanagan v. Flanagan, 273 App. Div. 918, 77 N.Y.S.2d 682 (2d Dep't) (mem.), aff'd
mem., 298 N.Y. 787, 83 N.E.2d 473 (1948).
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priate the earnings of the corporation either to the payment of di-
vidends or to extension of plant." 9'
On the other hand, mandatory dividend provisions, where part of
the individual shareholder's share contract with his corporation, are
probably valid, provided they are restricted to funds legally available
for their declaration, even though they clearly limit the director's
discretion.92
Any fixed, or percentage, dividend guarantee might, however, be
construed to be a "preference," making the shares benefited thereby a
form of preferred stock. The shares would then be subject to the
statutory requirements governing such stock, including the necessity
for a certificate of incorporation provision detailing the rights given. 93
Despite this, it must be remembered that one of the provisions of the
shareholder agreement upheld in Clark v. Dodge94 required that
plaintiff "should during his life receive one-fourth of the net income of
the corporations either by way of salary or dividends . . . . "9 The
agreement between the two sole stockholders was held to be not
improperly restrictive of the powers of the board, and thus, specifically
enforceable. The court added, however, that it would construe the
division of profits provision "as meaning whatever was left for dis-
tribution after the directors had in good faith set aside whatever they
deemed wvise." 96
91. Cuppy v. Ward, 187 App. Div. 625, 630, 176 N.Y.S. 233, 237 (1st Dep't), aff'd mem.,
227 N.Y. 603, 125 N.E. 915 (1919).
92. H. Ballantine, Corporations § 221, at 520 (rev. ed. 1946); Note, Mandatory Dividend
Provisions in Shareholders' Contracts, 9 Syracuse L. Rev. 239, 248 (1958).
The restriction to funds legally available would appear to distinguish Lindgrove v. Schluter &
Co., 256 N.Y. 439, 444-45, 176 N.E. 832, 833-34 (1931) (holding such a provision void) from
Castorland Milk & Cheese Co. v. Shantz, 179 N.Y.S. 131, 134-35 (Sup. Ct. 1919) (upholding
such a guaranteed dividend). The governing statute today is N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 510
(McKinney 1963), which imposes a surplus and solvency limitation.
93. N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 501(a) (McKinney 1963). See also id. §§ 402(al(S) 508(b).
94. 269 N.Y. 410, 199 N.E. 641 (1936).
95. Id. at 414, 199 N.E. at 642. The agreement further guarded against dissipation of those
corporate earnings by continuing that "no unreasonable or incommensurate salaries should be
paid to other officers or agents which would so reduce the net income as materially to affect
Clark's profits." Id., 199 N.E.2d at 642.
96. Id. at 417, 199 N.E. at 643. See also Bernstein v. Esskay Waist Co., 176 N Y.S. 94 (Sup.
Ct. 1919), which involved an agreement among all (three) shareholders of a corporation providing
for equal distribution among them of half of the corporation's profits, and retention of the balance
which was "to be credited to the profit account of the respective parties . . " Id. at 95. On
termination of the contract by mutual consent the court held that the retained profits were to be
distributed in the same manner. It further specifically upheld the validity of the underlying
agreement, stating: "Neither do I find in the law relating to corporations any reason why the
intention of the parties in respect to such undistributed profits should not now be carried out. It is
not proposed to impair the capital of the corporation as fixed in its certificate of incorporation,
because it is only profits that the plaintiff is seeking his share of; nor, so far as appears in the
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Thirteen years later, in Christal v. Petry,97 the court approved an
agreement for equal monetary return despite disparate share-
holdings-between the 51 percent and 44 percent shareholders--
where the majority holder signed the letter agreement in his capacity
as president of the corporation. The court, however, refused to enforce
a less than unanimous agreement not to increase the number of
directors.
More recently, the court of appeals, by affirming the appellate
division in Weber v. Sidney, 98 has reiterated its approval of unani-
mous agreements for the division of corporate profits, even in the
absence of formal approval by the corporation itself. In that case,
plaintiff and defendant, sole and equal shareholders, had a long-
standing oral agreement for an equal division of earnings and profits so
long as they remained owners of the defendant corporation. Although
the appellate division stated that "[a]n agreement between stockholders
for equal compensation from corporate earnings is not generally
enforcible [sic] directly against the corporation which was not a party
thereto," 99 it continued:
The plaintiff, however, within the framework of this action, is entitled to a
declaration as to the validity and enforcibility [sic] of the established agreement as
between himself and the individual defendant Sidney. On abundance of authority,
such an agreement is valid and binding upon the stockholders. Having chartered and
followed year after year a course patterned on the existence of this particular
agreement, the stockholder parties here are to be held to its terms. Certainly, the
defendant Sidney, reaping and retaining over the years the advantages and benefits of
the agreement, and, in fact, now holding corporate office and emoluments by virtue of
the same, is not in a position to successfully challenge it. It may and should be
enforced as against him and also as against the corporation, so far as is consistent with
the due recognition of the corporate form. 100
While these cases indicate the independent validity in New York of
the type of agreement on profit division authorized by the Maryland
statute, a section 620(b) provision turning over director functions to
the shareholders would obviously serve to overcome any lingering
doubts based on directorial interference.
pleadings, will the rights of creditors or any other outsiders who may have had dealings with the
corporation be impaired or in anywise affected.
"... [S]o long as its capital remains unimpaired and its creditors and others to whom it had
obligations were not harmed, I cannot see why the agreement of the parties should not be carried
out." Id. at 95-96.
97. 275 App. Div. 550, 90 N.Y.S.2d 620 (1st Dep't 1949), aff'd mem., 301 N.Y. 562, 93
N.E.2d 450 (1950).
98. 14 N.Y.2d 929, 200 N.E.2d 867, 252 N.Y.S.2d 327 (1964), affg 19 App. Div. 2d 494,
244 N.Y.S.2d 228 (Ist Dep't 1963). See also Beck v. Motler, 42 App. Div. 2d 1020, 348 N.Y.S.2d
397 (3d Dep't 1973).
99. 19 App. Div. 2d at 498, 244 N.Y.S.2d at 232.
100. Id. at 498-99, 244 N.Y.S.2d at 233 (citations omitted).
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H. Arbitration
The Maryland statute does not expressly deal with intracorporate
arbitration agreements. This lacuna is filled by the Florida Close
Corporation Law, which allows an agreement relating to, "[a]rbitra-
tion of issues as to which the stockholders are deadlocked in voting
power or as to which the directors are deadlocked and the stockholders
are unable to break the deadlock."''
In an early New York decision,' 0 2 the court refused to reinstate a
shareholder to his officer status even though he had been removed
without submission of the matter to arbitration as required by his
agreement with his co-shareholders, and established the principle that
arbitration of director-level disputes is invalid. Although intervening
lower court cases vacillated, 10 3 not even the most recent court of
appeals decisions have clearly repudiated this principle.1t 4 On the
other hand, it seems clear that disputes among shareholders in their
shareholder capacities are arbitrable in New York when so provided in
an agreement among them. 10 5 If a section 620(b) provision transfers
director power to the shareholders, all management disputes become
shareholder disputes, and, accordingly, should be arbitrable under a
shareholder agreement providing for this remedy. This will be true so
long as shareholder consent is unanimous, even if the corporation is
not (although it should be)' 0 6 a party to the agreement. t0 7
101. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 608.75(I)(g) (Supp. 1974). The Florida Statute has its own omission: it
fails to authorize dissolution agreements. Furthermore, it should be noted that the arbitration
authorization is undesirably limited to deadlock situations.
102. In re Allied Fruit & Extract Co., 243 App. Div. 52, 276 N.Y.S. 153 fist Dep't 1934).
103. See discussion in 2 F. O'Neal, Close Corporations §§ 9.15, 9.16 (1971).
104. See Glekel v. Gluck, 30 N.Y.2d 93, 98, 281 N.E.2d 171, 173, 330 N.Y.S.2d 371, 374
(1972) and Vogel v. Lewis, 19 N.Y.2d 589, 590, 224 N.E.2d 738, 278 N.Y.S.2d 236, 237 (1967),
the latter affirming arbitration as not improper "when viewed against the factual background of
the case," and the former reversing the appellate division's denial of arbitration on the ground
that a director's agreement to "use his best efforts" was not a direct interference with the
directors. But see Matter of Staklinski, 6 N.Y.2d 159, 160 N.E.2d 78, 188 N.Y.S.2d 541 (1959),
upholding specific performance of an arbitral award of reinstatement of an employee under a
contract between him and the corporation, despite the objection that this interfered with the
board's management powers.
105. See N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 620(a) (McKinney 1963), set out at text accompanying note
7 supra. The provision for voting "in accordance with a procedure agreed upon by them," seems
a clear acceptance of arbitration as such a procedure. And id. § 609(0(5) expressly allows grant of
an irrevocable proxy to "[a] person designated by or under an agreement under paragraph (a) of
section 620," a clear authorization for implementation of the arbitrator's decision on how the
shareholders should vote as such. See also Blum Folding Paper Box Co. v. Friedlander, 27
N.Y.2d 35, 261 N.E.2d 382, 313 N.Y.S.2d 375 (1970).
106. See 2 F. O'Neal, Close Corporations § 9.21 (1971).
107. Siegel v. Ribak, 43 Misc. 2d 7, 13, 249 N.Y.S.2d 903, 909 (Sup. Ct. 1964) expressly held
a shareholder agreement for arbitration of disputes between them to be enforceable even though
the corporation was not itself a party. The holding in this regard seems clearly to have been
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I. Summary
From the foregoing discussion it would appear that many of the
same benefits obtainable under more modern statutes are available by
unanimous shareholder agreement in New York. It is even clearer that
transferring management to the shareholders under a section 620(b)
provision, when coupled with other certificate of incorporation provi-
sions as to shareholder election of officers, high vote, and dissolution
tied to shareholder agreement events, will give even greater assurance
of the availability of such benefits. Furthermore, if the entire arrange-
ment is accorded the hoped for sympathetic judicial treatment, all of
the benefits of the more modern close corporation laws may prove to
be available.
III. ADDITIONAL MATTERS
A. Informality
Transferring management to the shareholders, as section 620(b)
appears to allow, also has other advantages. While the New York
legislature has only recently amended the Business Corporation Law to
provide for the substitution of unanimous written consent for a
director's meeting, 10 8 the same has long been true of informal action
by shareholders. Section 615 expressly allows unanimous written
shareholder consent to substitute for a meeting. 10 9 Thus, if manage-
ment is conferred upon the shareholders, the participants' informal, or
even separate, consent to decisions can be validated in the same way
approved by the court of appeals in its affirmance of Kolmer-Marcus, Inc. v. Winer, 32 App.
Div. 2d 763, 300 N.Y.S.2d 952 (1st Dep't 1969) (mem.), aff'd mem., 26 N.Y.2d 795, 257 N.E.2d
664, 309 N.Y.S.2d 220 (1970). In the latter decision, the corporation was held bound by a share
transfer agreement to which it was also not a party. See also Weber v. Sidney, 19 App. Div. 2d
494, 244 N.Y.S.2d 228 (1st Dep't 1963), aff'd mem., 14 N.Y.2d 929, 200 N.E.2d 867, 252
N.Y.S.2d 327 (1964).
108. Law of May 23, 1974, ch. 517, § 708, [1974] N.Y. Laws 197th Sess. 691, amending
N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 708 (McKinney 1963).
109. N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 615(a) (McKinney 1963) provides: "Whenever under this
chapter shareholders are required or permitted to take any action by vote, such action may be
taken without a meeting on written consent, setting forth the action so taken, signed by the
holders of all outstanding shares entitled to vote thereon. This paragraph shall not be construed
to alter or modify the provisions of any section or any provision in a certificate of incorporation
not inconsistent with this chapter under which the written consent of the holders of less than all
outstanding shares is sufficient for corporate action."
The meaning of the last sentence is not completely clear. Israels interprets it to allow less than
unanimous consent, even though authorized by the certificate of incorporation, only in situations
where shareholder approval would not normally be required. C. Israels, Corporate Practice
§§ 7.13, 9.37 (2d ed. 1969). Quaere whether it is applicable where management is transferred to
the shareholders under a § 620(b) provision. It would, accordingly, seem unwise to rely on less
than unanimous approval.
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as under more permissive statutes-that is, by a simple signed ap-
proval of the transaction. 110
Obviously, then, execution of a formal shareholder consent to
adoption of the shareholders' agreement by the corporation will be
sufficient corporate action to make its provisions binding on the
corporation. Thus, for example, persons designated in the agreement
should be effectively employed by the corporation as officers and
employees, and the corporation will at least be bound to arbitration of
any dispute between it and the parties to the agreement."i
Furthermore, it seems equally clear that such written consent can
also be used to validate day-to-day management decisions agreed to by
all of the shareholders."1 2 Even less formality than a section 615
consent, as to both the approval of the shareholder agreement and
day-to-day management, may well be possible in the shareholder-
managed corporation. Thus, Ballantine states: "Where all of the
shareholders of a company make a unanimous agreement as to a
corporate transaction, there is no necessity for any further formality,
and the company will be bound by the unanimous agreement of its
members, subject to possible rights of creditors." 113 In an early case
the New York Court of Appeals stated: "Certainly, what the stockhold-
ers might have done by the requisite vote, at a formal meeting, they
might do by agreement between themselves, to which the assent of
every one was obtained." 114
A more recent case, decided under the Business Corporation Law,
also demonstrates that the requisite shareholder consent need not be
expressed in any special form. Cross Properties, Inc. v. Brook Realty
Co. 115 held that the minutes of a board of directors' meeting of the
110. Actually, even greater informality is possible, since the shareholders can give proxies to
another person to execute the written consent. N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 609(a) (McKinney 1963).
Only one state appears to authorize directors to vote by proxy. See La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 12:81E
(1969).
111. See N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 202(a)(2) (McKinney 1963).
112. Dickson, commenting on the Florida statute which expressly allows abolition of the
board and transfer of management to the shareholders, raises a question as to whether the
shareholders will vote in the normal shareholder manner (per share) or as directors (per capita)
where management has been transferred to them. Dickson, The Florida Close Corporation Act:
An Experiment That Failed, 21 U. Miami L. Rev. 842, 850 (1967). It would seem reasonably
clear under the New York statute that they will vote as shareholders normally do. See N.Y. Bus.
Corp. Law § 612(a) (McKinney 1963).
113. H. Ballantine, Corporations § 170, at 390-91 (rev. ed. 1946).
114. Elyea v. Lehigh Salt Mining Co., 169 N.Y. 29, 33, 61 N.E. 992, 992-93 (1901). See al:.o
Haff v. Long Island Fuel Corp., 233 App. Div. 117, 251 N.Y.S. 67 (2d Dep't 1931). upholding
corporate notes given by the treasurer to whom the shareholders had confided management by
their common consent.
115. 37 App. Div. 2d 193, 322 N.Y.S.2d 773 (2d Dep't 1971), aff'd mem., 31 N.Y.2d 938,
293 N.E.2d 95, 340 N.Y.S.2d 928 (1972).
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parent corporation, approving the sale of substantially all of the assets
of its wholly owned subsidiary, constituted a sufficient writing to
comply with subdivision (a) of section 615, and, accordingly, that the
consent required by section 909(a) had been given. 116
O'Neal states the rule on shareholder informality even more strongly
than Ballantine:
The courts now generally hold also that all the shareholders may by acquiescence
waive the requirement of a meeting and impliedly authorize corporate acts to be done
without a meeting. Further, even if the requirement of a meeting is not waived, a
gathering of the participants may be held to be a valid meeting though no special
formalities are observed; the presence and participation of all shareholders or members
are all that is necessary to constitute a valid meeting. The fact that minutes are not
kept or resolutions recorded does not invalidate acts done or authorized at the
meeting. 117
Again, there are New York cases in accord. 11 8 Therefore, although
it is wise to memorialize all "meetings" even though informally con-
vened, or to have the action consented to in writing, a shareholder-
managed corporation stands a good chance of successfully operating
under its shareholder agreement without observing much of the usual
corporate ritual.
B. Unanimity
Both the Maryland and Florida shareholder agreement provisions
require that all of the shareholders be parties. 1 9 The New York cases
116. Id. at 202, 322 N.Y.S.2d at 782. It should be noted, however, that the strongest
argument against the necessity for formal shareholder action is found in the cases which have
held the corporation bound by shareholder agreements without any attempt at corporate
adoption. See note 78 supra.
117. 2 F. O'Neal, Close Corporations § 8.03, at 7 (1971) (footnotes omitted).
118. In Sire Plan, Inc. v. Mintzer, 38 Misc. 2d 920, 922, 237 N.Y.S.2d 123, 127 (Sup. Ct.
1963), the court observed: "In the light of the fact that Davidson was the sole stockholder, hIs
action in voting for the removal of the directors without causing defendant or the directors to call
a special meeting for that purpose was a mere irregularity, which Davidson, as the only
stockholder, could waive. The provisions of the by-law for the calling of a special meeting were
intended for the benefit of the stockholders and may be waived by them if present at the meeting
(5 Fletcher, Cyclopedia of Corporations, § 1999)."
See also N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 606 (McKinney 1963) as to waiver of notice by attendance at a
meeting without protest. For other cases recognizing the validity of unanimous shareholder action
without a formal meeting, see Annot., 51 A.L.R. 941 (1927). (New York cases appear to be in
accord). It has been further held, following the general rule (18 C.J.S. Corporations § 554 (1939)),
that no minutes of the meeting need be kept. Gale-Hasslacher Corp. v. Carmen Contracting
Corp., 219 N.Y.S.2d 212, 216 (Sup. Ct. 1961). Although this rule appears to have been changed
by N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 624(a) (McKinney 1963), it is by no means clear that failure to record
the shareholders' concurrence will invalidate the action taken, provided it can be satisfactorily
proved. See, e.g., W. Cary, Corporations 190 (4th ed. unabr. 1973) discussing failure to obtain
shareholder approval where required by statute.
119. Compare Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 354 (Supp. 1968) which does not expressly impose
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prior to the enactment of the Business Corporation Law involving
agreements covering the same matters authorized by the Maryland and
Florida statutes show that, while unanimity would not necessarily
guarantee validity, lack of unanimity was almost certain to guarantee
invalidity. Under the Business Corporation Law, it is theoretically
possible that some agreements will be valid, even though less than all
of the shareholders are parties to them. Thus, for example, a majority
of the shareholders can undoubtedly select officers they agree upon if
the certificate of incorporation confers upon them the power to elect
officers, 120 since an agreement by less than all of the shareholders to
vote as shareholders is expressly made lawful. 121 The same majority
can even amend the certificate of incorporation to insert the necessary
implementing provision. 1
22
Although an amendment to add a section 620(b) provision requires
unanimous (even non-voting) shareholder consent, 123 insertion of the
provision in the original certificate only requires approval of "all the
incorporators. '124 Normally only one person signs the certificate. 12S
Thus, if the sterilization takes the form of a transfer of board power to
the shareholders, their less than unanimous agreement should suffice
for all decisions properly within the scope of the directorial function
-that is, most of the matters dealt with in the Maryland and Florida
statutory provisions.
Since less than unanimous shareholder agreements pertaining to
management matters can, therefore, be validated in New York, pro-
vided the certificate of incorporation contains the necessary authoriz-
ing language, New York law is arguably even more "liberal" than the
more modern statutes on close corporations. The question is largely
academic, however, since, as a practical matter, management agree-
ments of the Maryland and Florida type will be feasible only where all
of the shareholders are parties to the arrangement
such a limitation. See also id. § 350 which expressly allows agreements restricting the power of
directors by a mere majority. On the other hand, substitution of shareholder management for the
board, like a N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 620(b) (McKinney 1963) provision, requires approval of all
the incorporators, subscribers or shareholders. Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 351 (Supp. 1968).
Anomalously, the Delaware certificate provision can be excised by a mere majority.
120. N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 715(b) (McKinney 1963) allows the certificate of incorporation to
provide for election of officers by the shareholders, rather than the directors.
121. Id. § 620(a) (McKinney Supp. 1973).
122. Id. § 803(a) (McKinney Supp. 1973). Only two-thirds of the shareholders (unless the
certificate of incorporation provides specifically for a greater number) are required to insert a
super-majority vote requirement. Thus, less than all can validate a unanimous consent require-
ment. Id. § 616(b) (McKinney 1963).
123. Id. § 620(b)(1) (icKinney 1963).
124. Id.
125. See id. § 401 (McKinney 1963).
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In the first place, no sensible New York lawyer will insert the
implementing certificate of incorporation provisions without approval
of all participants, 126 and the obvious condition for such approval will
be participation in the benefits of the underlying agreement. Secondly,
the effectiveness of the management arrangement ultimately demands
that all participants be parties to it. This is obvious in the case of share
transfer restrictions imposed by agreement, since these will only bind
the parties and transferees with notice of them. 127 The same reasoning
would seem to apply if the agreement is to determine the conditions of
dissolution.
If the uncertainty as to the enforceability of a mere agreement
requiring consent of all the parties to corporate action results in the
inclusion of high vote provisions in the certificate of incorporation, the
benefit of any veto thereby given cannot be denied to a non-party to
the agreement. As to matters which the agreement, once validated by
a section 620(b) provision, would presumably control (for example,
hiring of employees, selection of officers, and declaration of dividends)
although only the holders of a majority of the shares were parties to
the agreement, no corporation should be consciously set up with
built-in dissension, since the fruits of discord are almost certain to be
financial failure. In short, if the parties cannot all agree, at least in the
beginning, they had best not incorporate at all.
The last reason for not undertaking a shareholder-managed corpora-
tion unless all participants are parties to the underlying agreement is to
increase the likelihood of judicial enforcement of the arrangement.
As indicated above, while unanimity was not a complete guarantee
of enforceability of agreements prior to the Business Corporation Law,
the fact that there were outstanding non-party minority interests was a
significant factor in denying validity. As also indicated, the scope of
permissible agreement provisions, even with an implementing section
620(b) certificate provision, is not completely certain. The courts can
be expected to lean toward invalidity if they feel imposition on the
minority is present or likely. 128 Just as under the old law, the fact that
all participants approved should foster enforceability. 129
126. If the lawyer represents all of the initial participants, he has an obligation to disclose the
effects of certificate provisions on the interests of all parties. Smith, Book Review, 43 Clev. B.J.
243, 244 n.5 (1972). If any participant is represented by his own attorney, the latter, of course,
can be expected (if for no better reason than potential malpractice liability) to protect his client
from acceptance of an arrangement conferring benefits from which he is excluded.
127. See Tomoser v. Kamphausen, 307 N.Y. 797, 121 N.E.2d 622 (1954).
128. See, e.g., the hypertechnical interpretation given to N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 702(b)
(McKinney 1963) by the court of appeals to protect a minority shareholder from imposition by the
majority holder in Model, Roland & Co. v. Industrial Accoustics Co., 16 N.Y.2d 703, 209
N.E.2d 553, 261 N.Y.S.2d 896 (1965) (mem.).
129. The fact that there are no "outside" shareholders will also be important in securing
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Accordingly, where, as will always be advisable in order to avoid
later disagreement as to basics, the shareholder-managed corporation
will be governed by an underlying shareholder agreement, all
shareholders should be parties, as is required under the special Mary-
land and Florida statutes.
IV. DRAFTING THE PAPERS
From the above discussion the outline of the terms of the documents
desirable for the shareholder-managed corporation should be clear.
Although the by-laws should be so drafted that they contain no
inconsistent provisions, the two most important documents are the
underlying shareholder agreement and the implementing certificate of
incorporation.
The unanimous shareholder agreement should include provisions as
to the management of the corporation (including, if desired, conferring
control over particular aspects of the business on certain participants),
share transfer restrictions, voting (including matters on which unani-
mous concurrence will be required), election of officers, hiring of
employees (including the shareholder-parties), profit distribution, dis-
solution, and arbitration of disputes among the parties; in short, all of
the matters expressly authorized as subjects of shareholder agreements
under the Maryland and Florida statutes.
Each agreement should be tailored to fit the needs of the particular
clients. There is, however, no shortage of form models which can be
modified for the purpose.130
There are certain expressions which it seems wise to include. Thus,
the Beresovski clause 13 1 should be added, just in case the power
delegation in the certificate is not sufficiently specific. There are also
two phrases which seem to have an almost magical effect in New
York. One is: "best efforts." An agreement by the parties to use their
"best efforts" to secure the agreed upon action seems to have a much
greater chance of success than a naked promise to accomplish it.
Another is: "faithful, loyal and efficient." An employment arrangement
where the employee's or officer's job is contingent upon his remaining
"faithful, loyal and efficient," seems to have a greater chance of
unanimous written consent for shareholder operating decisions under N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law §
615(a) (McKinney 1963), necessary to avoid a formal meeting.
130. E.g., C. Israels, Corporate Practice app. A (2d ed. 1969) (shareholders' agreements); id.
app. B (employment agreements); 2 F. O'Neal, Close Corporations §§ 10.32-.36 (1971) (sharehol-
ders' agreements). See also id. §§ 10.37-.40 (stock purchase agreements); id. § 10.44 (longterm
employment contracts). Many of the charter and by-law provisions included in chapter 10 can
also be modified for shareholder agreements. See R. Kessler, New York Close Corporations §
8.07 (1968). Many of the cases discussed above will also supply useful language.
131. See note 28 supra.
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success than a simple promise to keep him on come what may. 132 The
most important document however, is the certificate of incorporation,
whose provisions must provide the umbrella for any agreement.
The above discussion has indicated in a general fashion what
certificate provisions might be desirable. It should now be possible to
assemble them, using more specific language, into a tentative
certificate of incorporation for a New York shareholder-managed close
corporation. 1
33
132. See, e.g., Glekel v. Gluck, 30 N.Y.2d 93, 281 N.E.2d 171, 330 N.Y.S.2d 371 (1972)
(agreement in which "best efforts" were required sustained); Clark v. Dodge, 269 N.Y. 410, 199
N.E. 641 (1936) (agreement which required manager to be "faithful, efficient, and competent"
sustained). See also Fells v. Katz, 256 N.Y. 67, 175 N.E. 516 (1931) (denying plaintiff's claim
where the employment contract only required "best efforts" and not that he be "faithful, efficient
and competent"). But see McQuade v. Stoneham, 263 N.Y. 323, 189 N.E. 234 (1934) (agreement
requiring "best endeavors" held not valid where not all shareholders were parties).
133. Such a certificate would at least include a § 620(b) provision transferring management
from the board to the shareholders (see notes 30-34 supra and accompanying text), a provision for
the election of officers by shareholders (see notes 81-85 supra and accompanying text), an
appropriate dissolution provision (see notes 41-54 supra and accompanying text) and a high vote
and quorum provision (see notes 55-67 supra and accompanying text). Among the leading articles
which should be consulted as to the earlier New York cases are Delaney, The Corporate Director:
Can His Hands Be Tied in Advance, 50 Colum. L. Rev. 52 (1950); Israels, The Close
Corporation and The Law, 33 Cornell L.Q. 489 (1948); Meek, Employment of Corporate
Executives by Majority Shareholders, 47 Yale L.J. 1079 (1938); Comment, "Shareholders'
Agreements" and the Statutory Norm, 43 Cornell L.Q. 68 (1957).
